Johnson v. Rodrigues (Ovozco): An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Utah\u27s Adoption Statutes by Chow, Sarah K.L.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2001 | Issue 1 Article 6
3-1-2001
Johnson v. Rodrigues (Ovozco): An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of Utah's Adoption Statutes
Sarah K.L. Chow
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sarah K.L. Chow, Johnson v. Rodrigues (Ovozco): An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Utah's Adoption Statutes, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 349
(2001).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2001/iss1/6
6CHO-FIN.DOC 2/22/01 8:04 PM 
 
349 
Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco): An Analysis of the 
Constitutionality of Utah’s Adoption Statutes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Adoption statutes attempt to balance the rights and interests of 
adopted children, adoptive parents, birth mothers, birth fathers, and 
the states’ interests in providing safe and secure homes for children. 
However, not all involved parties may feel that their interests are 
properly protected. For example, in Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco),1 
the unwed, putative (i.e. supposed) father of a child placed for adop-
tion challenged the constitutionality of Utah’s adoption statutes, 
claiming that they violated due process. Under Utah law, an unwed 
father’s parental rights are only recognized if he registers with the 
Department of Health before an unwed mother consents to the 
adoption of an infant or relinquishes an infant to an adoption 
agency.2 If an unwed father fails to register in a timely manner, he 
loses his right to notice and consent in an infant adoption proceed-
ing.3 
In Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), the district court dismissed 
Johnson’s claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4 How-
ever, on August 28, 2000, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s claim and allowed, 
for the first time, the constitutionality of Utah’s adoption statutes to 
be challenged in federal court.5 The issue of whether federal court is 
the proper forum for determining the constitutionality of Utah’s 
adoption statutes is very controversial and important; however, this 
Note focuses only on the issue of the constitutionality of the statutes. 
This Note finds Utah’s adoption statutes facially constitutional with 
respect to both due process and equal protection rights but recog-
nizes that the statutes may violate due process as applied in certain 
cases. In order to avoid unconstitutionality as applied in such cases, 
 
 1. No. 99-4127, 2000 WL 1217833 (10th Cir. Aug. 28, 2000). 
 2. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.14 (2000). 
 3. See id. § 78-30-4.13. 
 4. See Johnson, 2000 WL 1217833, at *3. 
 5. See id. at *7. 
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this Note proposes that the Utah State Legislature revise Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes to include a proposed “fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion” exception. 
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of Utah’s adoption 
statutes. Part III sets forth the facts of Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco) 
and briefly discusses the significance of the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
to hear Johnson’s constitutionality claim in federal court. Part IV 
analyzes the constitutionality of Utah’s adoption statutes in terms of 
due process and equal protection rights based on case law from the 
United States Supreme Court and from Utah state courts. Part IV 
also sets forth public policies that support Utah’s adoption statutes 
and proposes an exception to them that will enable the statutes to be 
constitutional both facially and as applied. Part V concludes that the 
federal court should find Utah’s adoption statutes facially constitu-
tional but also concludes that the Utah State Legislature should 
adopt this Note’s proposed exception so that the statutes will be able 
to withstand future constitutional attacks both facially and as applied. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In the early 1990s, the story of “Baby Jessica”6 had a profound 
effect on adoption laws throughout the United States. In 1991, a 
twenty-eight-year-old unwed mother in Iowa, Cara Clausen, gave 
birth to Baby Jessica. Having broken up with the baby’s biological 
father, Daniel Schmidt, Cara lied about the identity of Baby Jessica’s 
father and placed her for adoption with a couple from Michigan.7 
When Cara reunited with Daniel, she sought to revoke her consent 
to the adoption, and Daniel sought to intervene in the adoption pro-
ceedings on the basis that he never consented to Baby Jessica’s adop-
tion.8 Despite the fact that the adoptive couple “provided exemplary 
care for the child [and] view[ed] themselves as the parents of [the] 
child in every respect,”9 the courts were bound to apply Iowa law as 
it existed.10 Thus, after two and a half years, Baby Jessica was taken  
 
 
 6. “Baby Jessica” has also been referred to in court records and by the media as “Baby 
Girl Clausen,” “B.G.C.,” and “Jessica Clausen.” 
 7. See In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
 8. See id. 
 9. In re Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992). 
 10. See id. 
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from the only parents she knew and given to her biological father, a 
man whom she had never seen before. 
In response to this story, many states changed their adoption 
laws to make adoption more secure and permanent. At the time, 
Utah already had adoption statutes to promote and protect adop-
tion.11 However, in 1995, the Utah legislature adopted U.C.A.  
§§ 78-30-4.11 to -4.15 (“Utah’s Adoption Statutes”), which clari-
fied the rights and responsibilities of parties involved in adoption 
proceedings.12 Utah’s Adoption Statutes reflect the state’s interest 
“in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a 
prompt manner [and] in preventing the disruption of adoptive 
placements.”13 An unwed, biological father, “by virtue of the fact 
that he has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed 
to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regard-
ing that child may occur, and has a duty to protect his own rights 
and interests” by complying with the statutes’ requirements.14 
If a child under six months of age is placed for adoption, an un-
wed father’s consent is not necessary unless the father fulfills three 
requirements.15 First, the father must file an affidavit with a court 
stating that he is able and willing to exercise full custody of the 
child;16 second, the father must register with the Department of 
Health (sign the “putative father registry”) before the child’s mother 
consents to adoption or relinquishes the child to an adoption 
agency;17 third, if the father is aware of the pregnancy, he must have 
paid a reasonable amount of both the pregnancy and child birth ex-
penses.18 If a child is placed for adoption more than six months after 
birth, the unwed father must share a substantial relationship with the 
child and financially support the child in order to preserve his right 
to notice and consent.19 
 
 
 11. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1.5 (2000); Id. § 78-30-4.1 (repealed 1995). 
 12. Compare id. §§ 78-30-4.11 to -4.15 (2000) with id. §§ 78-30-4.0, -4.1 (repealed 
1990, 1995). 
 13. Id. §78-30-4.12(2)(a) (2000). 
 14. Id. § 78-30-4.13(1). 
 15. See id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). 
 16. See id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i). 
 17. See id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(ii). 
 18. See id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii). 
 19. See id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(a). 
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The Utah State Legislature enacted Utah’s Adoption Statutes to 
promote the finality of adoptions and to avoid situations like that of 
Baby Jessica. Putative fathers must strictly comply with Utah’s Adop-
tion Statutes in order to preserve their parental rights. If they fail to 
comply with the statutes, they will lose their right to notice and con-
sent in adoption proceedings. 
III. JOHNSON V. RODRIGUES (OROZCO) AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
In 1996, Monica Rodrigues (Orozco) allegedly conceived a child 
with Victor Johnson in Arizona.20 The child, known as “Baby 
Orozco,” was born in Orem, Utah, and placed for adoption with a 
Utah couple.21 Johnson claims that because Rodrigues told him that 
she had an abortion during her first trimester, he did not know 
about the baby’s existence until two months after its birth.22 After 
learning about Baby Orozco’s existence, Johnson attempted to lo-
cate the baby and prevent finalization of the adoption; however, his 
efforts were unsuccessful.23 
On August 5, 1998, Johnson filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah, averring jurisdiction under the 
diversity statute, the federal question statute, and the declaratory 
judgment act.24 In filing this action, Johnson alleged that Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes are unconstitutional because they deny an unwed 
father the “fundamental right to maintain a parent-child relation-
ship.”25 Johnson claimed that the statutes violate due process be-
cause they do not require a mother to produce the name of a possi-
ble father and because they only require notice to an unwed father of 
adoption proceedings if the father has signed in a timely fashion the 
state’s putative father registry.26 
 
 
 
 20. Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), No. 99-4127, 2000 WL 1217833 (10th Cir. Aug. 
28, 2000), has not yet proceeded beyond a motion to dismiss. The facts set forth in this Note 
are those facts pleaded by Plaintiff Johnson, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 
as the courts viewed them in determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss. 
 21. See Johnson, 2000 WL 1217833, at *1. 
 22. See id. at *1–2. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at *1. 
 25. Id. at *2. 
 26. See id. 
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The district court dismissed Johnson’s claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.27 However, on August 28, 2000, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision and allowed, for the first time, the federal courts to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the statutes.28 Since the 1800s, mat-
ters dealing with child custody have been decided in state courts29 
based on the United States Supreme Court’s mandate that federal 
courts not exercise diversity jurisdiction over domestic relations 
cases.30 
Instead of following precedent and dismissing Johnson’s consti-
tutional claim,31 the Tenth Circuit distinguished between Johnson’s 
custody request and his constitutional claim. The court held that the 
domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction barred the court 
from adjudicating Johnson’s custody claim.32 However, “[the] un-
derlying claims making a general challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Utah adoption statutory scheme . . . [fall outside the domestic 
relations exception and] must be considered in the context of federal 
question jurisdiction.”33 Thus, the Tenth Circuit remanded John-
son’s constitutional claim to the federal district court and noted that 
if the district court were to find Utah’s Adoptions Statutes 
unconstitutional, the parties could bring the custody and adoption 
issues to state court for new proceedings.34 On remand, the district 
court will likely find Utah’s Adoption Statutes facially constitutional  
 27. See id. at *3. 
 28. See id. In 1987, a case challenging the constitutionality of Utah’s adoption statutes 
was filed in United States District Court. The federal court held that it was “appropriate to 
exercise discretion by requiring resolution by the state courts of the questions here presented.” 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1537, 1546 (D. Utah 1987). All other cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state adoption statutes prior to Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco) 
have also been decided by state courts. 
 29. See Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 31 (2d Cir. 1986); Peter-
son v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 
787 (3d Cir. 1972); Swayne, 670 F. Supp. at 1546 (“[F]ederal courts ordinarily should defer 
to the state courts based upon the state’s strong interest in domestic relations matters, the su-
perior expertise of the state courts in settling such disputes and the possibility of incompatible 
state and federal orders.”). 
 30. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 
(1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, 
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”). 
 31. Compare Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), No. 99-4127, 2000 WL 1217833 (10th 
Cir. Aug. 28, 2000), with Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987). 
 32. See Johnson, 2000 WL 1217833, at *7. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
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likely find Utah’s Adoption Statutes facially constitutional but may 
find that because of the alleged misrepresentation to the biological 
father, the statutes violate due process as applied to the particular 
facts of Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco). A proper finding of the facts 
will be necessary in order to determine whether there actually was 
misrepresentation. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision to hear Johnson’s constitutional 
claim against Utah’s Adoption Statutes could affect many adopted 
children and their families. Utah state courts have previously found 
Utah’s Adoption Statutes constitutional.35 However, federal courts 
may interpret and value Utah’s statutes differently and may not share 
the same state interest in promoting adoptions and providing early 
and uninterrupted bonding between children and parents. If the fed-
eral court determines that Utah’s Adoption Statutes are unconstitu-
tional, unwed, putative fathers may be able to collaterally attack and 
undo adoptions finalized in Utah state courts. This could cause seri-
ous emotional and psychological trauma to adopted children and 
their families. Furthermore, without the assurance of finality in adop-
tion, potential adoptive couples may be deterred from adopting, 
which will cause children to miss out on the opportunity of being 
placed for adoption with stable families. Lastly, similar state adoption 
statutes in states belonging to the Tenth Circuit will also face the risk 
of being collaterally attacked in federal court, and adoptions finalized 
in those states will likewise face uncertainties and dangers. 
This Note analyzes Johnson’s due process claim and possible 
equal protection claims regarding Utah’s Adoption Statutes and con-
cludes that, under case law from the United States Supreme Court 
and Utah state courts, Utah’s Adoption Statutes are facially constitu-
tional. However, as applied in certain cases, Utah’s Adoption Stat-
utes may violate due process. Thus, in order to avoid such findings 
of unconstitutionality as applied in certain cases, this Note proposes a 
“fraudulent misrepresentation” exception to Utah’s current adoption 
statutes. 
 
 35. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986); Wells v. 
Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 
P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep’t of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
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A. The Constitutionality of Utah’s Adoption Statutes 
1. Do Utah’s Adoption Statutes violate due process? 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”36 The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he fun-
damental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”37 In Johnson v. 
Rodrigues (Orozco), Johnson claimed that Utah’s Adoption Statutes 
violated his due process rights by denying him notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in the adoption proceedings of “Baby Orozco.”38 
This section analyzes Johnson’s due process claim under case law 
from the United States Supreme Court and from Utah state courts, 
concluding that Utah’s Adoption Statutes do not facially violate due 
process but in certain cases, may violate due process as applied. 
a. United States Supreme Court precedent. In the 1970s and 
1980s the United States Supreme Court issued several opinions that 
provided general guidelines regarding unwed fathers’ parental rights. 
Generally, the Court seemed to hold that parental rights stem more 
from the nature of a father-child relationship than from biological 
ties. 
In 1972, Peter Stanley brought, for the first time, the issue of 
unwed father’s rights before the United States Supreme Court.39 
Stanley fathered three children with Joan Stanley over the course of 
an eighteen-year extramarital relationship.40 When Joan passed away, 
Illinois law, which presumed that unwed fathers were unfit to raise 
their children, mandated that Stanley’s children become wards of the 
state.41 The Court held that irrebuttably denying unwed fathers their 
parental rights violated due process.42 The court remanded the case  
 
 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 37. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 38. See Johnson, 2000 WL 1217833, at *1. 
 39. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 40. See id. at 646. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 658. 
6CHO-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:04 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
356 
for a determination of Stanley’s fitness as a father, noting that “noth-
ing in [the] record indicate[d] that Stanley is or has been a neglectful 
father who has not cared for his children.”43 
In 1983, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify its 
position with regard to unwed father rights when it decided Lehr v. 
Robertson.44 In Lehr, the Court held that an unwed father who did 
not establish a significant relationship with his child did not have a 
constitutional right to receive notice of an adoption proceeding in-
volving his child.45 The Court clearly distinguished between the 
rights of an unwed father who actively supports and cares for his 
child and one who does not,46 finding that the father in Lehr, unlike 
the father in Stanley, did not demonstrate a “full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood . . . [such that he] acquire[d] substan-
tial protection under the due process clause.”47 The Court explained 
that while biology alone is not enough to trigger an unwed father’s 
constitutionally protected rights, biology plus a significant and sup-
portive relationship with a child is sufficient.48 
Based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stanley and Lehr, 
Utah’s Adoption Statutes do not violate principles of due process. 
Unlike the Illinois law that the Supreme Court held unconstitutional 
in Stanley, Utah’s Adoption Statutes do not irrebuttably deny unwed 
fathers their parental rights. Rather, Utah’s Adoption Statutes follow 
the reasoning in Lehr and recognize the parental rights of an unwed 
father when there is a biological tie with a child plus a willingness to 
establish paternity and fulfill parental duties. In the adoption of a 
child who is under six months of age, Utah’s Adoption Statutes rec-
ognize a father’s right to consent to an adoption if a father has both 
signed in a timely fashion the state’s putative father registry and has 
filed a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have 
full custody of his child.49 In the adoption of a child who is over six 
months of age, the state recognizes an unwed father’s parental rights 
and requires his consent if a father has developed a substantial rela-
 
 43. Id. at 655. 
 44. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 45. See id. at 265. 
 46. See id. at 266–68. 
 47. Id. at 261. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (2000). 
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tionship with his child and has financially supported her.50 When an 
unwed father shares only a biological tie with a child, his parental 
rights are not recognized. Under the Lehr and Stanley holdings, the 
denial of parental rights under Utah’s Adoption Statutes to unwed 
fathers who do not show a “full commitment to the responsibilities 
of parenthood”51 does not violate due process. When applied to the 
case of Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), because Johnson shared only a 
biological tie with Baby Orozco and did not take action to establish 
a relationship with the child, due process was not violated by deny-
ing Johnson his parental rights. 
b. Utah state court precedent. The Utah Supreme Court has con-
sistently found Utah’s Adoption Statutes facially constitutional.52 
The court has reasoned that Utah’s Adoption Statutes prescribe a 
procedure to terminate the parental rights of an unwed father that is 
not arbitrary.53 Rather, the court has found that Utah’s Adoption 
Statutes are consistent with principles of due process because they 
“show (1) a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and 
(2) . . . the means adopted are ‘narrowly tailored to achieve the basic 
statutory purpose.’”54 The compelling state interest involves “speed-
ily identifying those persons who will assume a parental role over 
newborn illegitimate children” and providing the opportunity for 
“early and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents” 
through irrevocable adoption decrees.55 In order to promote this 
state interest, Utah courts have generally required strict compliance 
with the state’s adoption statutes.56 
However, despite the Utah Supreme Court’s repeated findings 
that the statutes are facially constitutional with respect to due proc-
ess, the court has remanded cases to determine whether they have 
violated due process as applied. For example, in Ellis v. Social Services 
 
 50. See id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(a). 
 51. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. 
 52. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986); Wells v. 
Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 
P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep’t of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
 53. See Wells, 681 P.2d at 206. 
 54. Id. (quoting In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah 1981)). 
 55. Id. at 206–07. 
 56. See, e.g., C.F. v. D.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999); Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,57 the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that in certain situations, it may be 
“impossible” for an unwed father to comply with the requirements 
of Utah’s Adoption Statutes “through no fault of his own.”58 In such 
cases, the court held that due process would be violated by the de-
mand for strict compliance with the statutes. Instead, an evidentiary 
hearing allowing unwed fathers an opportunity to show why they 
could not reasonably comply with the statutes should be allowed.59 
In Ellis, the unwed father alleged that the child’s mother left Cali-
fornia just prior to the child’s birth without telling the unwed father 
where she was going and immediately thereafter placed the child for 
adoption.60 The unwed father was allowed an opportunity to show, 
on remand, that it was “impossible” for him to comply with Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes “through no fault of his own” because he could 
not have reasonably known that his child would be born in Utah.61 
In In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe,62 an unwed couple who con-
ceived a child agreed to marry and raise their child together.63 While 
the unwed father was looking for housing in Arizona, the illegitimate 
child was born earlier than expected and placed for adoption in 
Utah.64 Because the father was out of town and was misled by the 
mother’s family with regard to the baby’s adoption proceedings, the 
court held that terminating the father’s parental rights for failing to 
strictly comply with Utah’s Adoption Statutes violated basic notions 
of due process.65 Thus, the court “deemed [the father] to have com-
plied with the statute” because he “came forward within a reasonable 
time after the baby’s birth.”66 
Since the decisions of Ellis and Baby Boy Doe, Utah’s Adoption 
Statutes have been amended and revised. The current version in-
cludes a provision that attempts to protect against finding the adop-
 
 57. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
 58. Id. at 1256. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986). 
 63. See id. at 687. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. at 691. 
 66. Id. (quoting Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep’t of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980)). 
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tion statutes unconstitutional when applied to situations similar to 
Ellis. The provision recognizes that there may be circumstances in 
which an out-of-state, unwed father may not reasonably be aware 
that he needs to comply with Utah’s Adoption Statutes.67 Thus, un-
der certain circumstances,68 strict compliance with the statutes’ re-
quirements is waived, and an evidentiary hearing is allowed.69 
While Utah’s Adoption Statutes have been revised to avoid fu-
ture findings of unconstitutionality as applied in cases similar to Ellis, 
changes in the statutes have not reflected the same goal with respect 
to cases of misrepresentation as in Baby Boy Doe. Instead, the statutes 
seem to have become more stringent with respect to an unwed fa-
ther’s responsibility to protect himself from fraudulent representa-
tion.70 
Under case law from the United States Supreme Court and Utah 
state courts, Utah’s Adoption Statutes do not facially violate princi-
ples of due process. However, as applied in certain cases, Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes have been found to violate due process. While the 
Legislature has responded to past findings of unconstitutionality by 
revising the statutes, additional revisions should be made to avoid 
the statutes being found unconstitutional when applied in cases in-
volving fraudulent misrepresentation. 
2. Do Utah’s Adoption Statutes violate equal protection rights? 
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution71 
guarantees that states may not enact legislation that treats persons 
 
 67. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.15(4) (2000). 
 68. In order for the provision to apply, the following requirements must be met:  
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in another state where the 
unmarried mother was also located or resided; (b) the mother left that state without 
notifying or informing the unmarried biological father that she could be located in 
the state of Utah; (c) the unmarried biological father has, through every reasonable 
means, attempted to locate the mother but does not know or have reason to know 
that the mother is residing in the state of Utah; and (d) the unmarried biological fa-
ther has complied with the most stringent and complete requirements of the state 
where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to protect and preserve 
his parental interest and right in the child in cases of adoption. 
Id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Part IV.B of this Note discusses the changes that have occurred in Utah’s Adoption 
Statutes with regard to fraudulent representation and proposes changes that should be made to 
the statutes to avoid future findings of unconstitutionality as applied. 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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who are “similarly situated” differently72 unless the disparate treat-
ment is based on differences that are relevant to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective or an important state purpose.73 Johnson’s com-
plaint does not claim that Utah’s Adoption Statutes violate his equal 
protection rights; however, Johnson could argue that the statutes 
violate principles of equal protection in three ways. First, Johnson 
could argue that Utah’s Adoption Statutes treat unwed mothers and 
unwed fathers differently because they unconditionally require the 
consent of unwed mothers prior to infant adoption proceedings but 
do not require the consent of unwed fathers unless they have signed 
the putative father registry in a timely manner. Second, Johnson 
could argue that the statutes mandate different treatment of fathers 
who sign the putative father registry and fathers who do not. Third, 
Johnson could argue that Utah’s Adoption Statutes treat unwed fa-
thers and married fathers differently by requiring unwed fathers to 
sign the putative father registry in order to preserve their rights to 
notice and consent in infant adoption proceedings of their children. 
As the following subsections demonstrate, under case law from the 
United States Supreme Court and Utah state courts, the three possi-
ble equal protection rights claims fail. 
 a. Unequal treatment of unwed fathers and unwed mothers. 
 (1) United States Supreme Court precedent. In Caban v. Mo-
hammed,74 the Supreme Court held that a New York law, which 
permitted unwed mothers but not unwed fathers to block an adop-
tion by withholding consent, violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because the distinction between unwed mothers and fathers bore no 
substantial relation to an important state interest.75 The Court re-
jected the argument that mothers should be treated differently be-
cause they bear a closer relationship with their children than do fa-
thers.76 The Court also rejected the argument that requiring the 
consent of unwed fathers would interfere with the state’s interest in 
protecting adoptions, reasoning that unwed fathers are no more 
 
 72. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 73. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–99 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 
(1971). 
 74. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 75. See id. at 388–94. 
 76. See id. at 388–89. 
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likely than unwed mothers to object to the adoption of their chil-
dren.77 
Although the Supreme Court ruled the sex-based distinction in 
Caban unconstitutional, it is important to note that the Court based 
its reasoning on the fact that the father in Caban shared a significant 
relationship with his children.78 The holding, therefore, was that the 
sex-based distinction was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of 
the Caban case. The unwed father in Caban was identified on his 
children’s birth certificates, and he provided support for his children, 
often visiting them and communicating with them.79 Because the 
mother and father shared relationships of equal quality and signifi-
cance with their children, the Court felt that the mother and father 
should also have equal rights with regard to their consent in the 
adoption proceedings.80 However, the Court, in dicta, explained that 
“in those cases where the father never has come forward to partici-
pate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection 
Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege 
of vetoing the adoption of that child.”81 
For example, in Lehr v. Robertson,82 the Supreme Court held that 
an adoption granted with the sole consent of the birth mother did 
not violate the unwed father’s equal protection rights because the fa-
ther was inattentive and had not established a significant relationship 
with his child. The Court stated that “[i]f one parent has . . . either 
abandoned or never established a relationship [with the child], the 
Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according the 
two parents different legal rights.”83 
Based on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Caban and Lehr, 
equal protection rights are not violated by Utah’s Adoption Statutes’ 
disparate treatment of unwed mothers and unwed fathers who do 
not show interest in their children or in protecting their parental 
rights. When a newborn infant is placed for adoption immediately 
after birth, a father may not have the chance to develop a significant 
relationship with his child. However, by signing a state’s putative fa-
 
 77. See id. at 391–92. 
 78. See id. at 382–83. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 392–94. 
 81. Id. at 392. 
 82. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 83. Id. at 267–68. 
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ther registry, a father can show his desire to develop a relationship 
with his child and can simultaneously safeguard his parental rights. 
 (2) Utah state court precedent. In accordance with principles 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that Utah’s Adoption Statutes’ disparate treatment of 
unwed mothers and unwed fathers who do not show an interest in 
their children does not violate equal protection rights. In Ellis,84 an 
unwed father claimed that Utah’s Adoption Statutes violated his 
equal protection rights by only requiring the mother’s affirmative 
consent in the adoption of a child born out of wedlock.85 The unwed 
father in Ellis relied on Caban to support his position that the “per-
mitting of unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to veto the adop-
tion of a child by withholding consent violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.”86 In response to the unwed father’s argument, the Utah 
Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Caban only applies when an unwed father claims 
paternity, supports his child, and maintains a significant relationship 
with his child.87 However, when an unwed father does not share a 
substantial relationship with his child, the state can withhold from an 
unwed father the right to veto an adoption without violating equal 
protection rights.88 
The Utah Supreme Court has upheld this decision in subsequent 
cases. For example, in Wells v. Children’s Aid Society of Utah,89 the 
court stated, in construing Ellis, that Utah’s Adoption Statutes do 
not violate equal protection rights because “there are reasonable 
bases for the classifications in the statute (between unwed mothers 
and fathers . . .) and that these classifications are reasonably calcu-
lated to serve a proper government objective.”90 The reasonable basis 
for the difference in classification between unwed mothers and un-
wed fathers is the need to identify fathers.91 Identification of a child’s 
mother is usually automatic because of her participation in the birth 
 
 84. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
 85. See id. at 1255. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). 
 90. Id. at 204. 
 91. See Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 641 (Utah 1990). 
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process; however, identification of a father is not always automatic.92 
If a mother does not voluntarily identify a father, putative father reg-
istries can help in the identification process. The government objec-
tive is to “(1) promptly determin[e] whether there is a man who will 
acknowledge paternity and assume the responsibilities of parenthood 
and, if not, (2) speedily mak[e] the child available for adoption.”93 
Therefore, under Utah case law, because the difference in classi-
fication of unwed mothers and unwed fathers in Utah’s Adoption 
Statutes has a reasonable basis and fulfills a government objective, 
Utah’s Adoption Statutes do not violate equal protection rights. The 
disparate treatment of unwed mothers and unwed fathers under 
Utah’s Adoption Statutes is not arbitrary but is tied to the important 
state interest of identifying unwed fathers and facilitating speedy and 
permanent placement of adopted children. 
 b. Unequal treatment of unwed fathers who sign the registry and 
those who do not. 
 (1) United States Supreme Court precedent. According to case 
law from the United States Supreme Court, disparate treatment of 
fathers who sign the registry and fathers who do not sign the registry 
does not violate principles of equal protection. In Lehr,94 the unwed 
father argued that New York’s putative father registry violated prin-
ciples of equal protection based upon the way it “distinguishe[d] 
among classes of fathers.”95 However, the Court held that such a dis-
tinction was “rational” and, therefore, did not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.96 
States with putative father registries have a rational interest in 
quickly identifying putative fathers who are entitled to notice of 
adoption proceedings and who are willing to parent children born 
out of wedlock. The registries provide a legal means to promptly de-
 
 92. See id. 
 93. Wells, 681 P.2d at 204. 
 94. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 95. Id. at 268 n.27. 
 96. Id. In determining whether statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause, different 
levels of scrutiny are applied to different types of classifications. For example, “strict scrutiny” is 
applied in cases involving “classifications based on race or national origin and classifications 
affecting fundamental rights.” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). “Rational-basis scru-
tiny” only requires that the discriminatory classification relate to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
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termine whether an unwed father desires to exercise his parental 
rights and fulfill his parental duties. They also help to ensure the 
permanency of an adoption and uninterrupted bonding between a 
child and adoptive parents by terminating the rights of an unwed fa-
ther to veto an adoption once he has failed to sign the registry in a 
timely manner. Therefore, because the disparate treatment of fathers 
who sign the registry and those who do not sign the registry is re-
lated to the legitimate governmental purposes of quickly establishing 
the rights of all parties involved in the births and adoptions of ille-
gitimate children, of facilitating planning for the future, and of pro-
tecting the best interests of the children, it passes the “rational-basis 
scrutiny” test and does not violate equal protection rights.97 Under 
this rule, Utah’s Adoption Statutes pass the “rational-basis scrutiny” 
test and do not violate equal protection rights by treating unwed fa-
thers who sign the registry differently from unwed fathers who do 
not sign the registry. 
 (2) Utah state court precedent. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that the disparate treatment of fathers who sign the registry and 
those who do not does not violate principles of equal protection.98 
The court’s holdings are based on the fact that there are “reasonable 
bases for the classifications [in Utah’s Adoption Statutes] ( . . . be-
tween fathers who file and fathers who do not) and . . . these classifi-
cations are reasonably calculated to serve a proper governmental ob-
jective.”99 The reasonable basis for the disparate treatment of fathers 
who file and fathers who do not is the need to distinguish between 
fathers who are willing to accept legal responsibility for their children 
and fathers who are not.100 The proper governmental objective is to 
“facilitate permanent and secure placement of illegitimate children 
whose unwed mothers wish to give them up for adoption and whose 
unwed fathers take no steps to officially identify themselves and ac-
knowledge paternity.”101 
Thus, if the federal court in Utah follows the reasoning and 
holdings of Utah state courts, it should hold that Utah’s Adoption 
 
 97. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264 n.20. 
 98. See, e.g., Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 641 (Utah 1990); Wells v. 
Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep’t of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
 99. Wells, 681 P.2d at 204. 
 100. See Swayne, 795 P.2d at 641. 
 101. Id. 
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Statutes do not violate principles of equal protection with respect to 
its unequal treatment of unwed fathers who sign the putative father 
registry and those who do not. Because the disparate treatment un-
der Utah’s Adoption Statutes of unwed fathers who sign the registry 
and those who do not is tied to a reasonable basis and proper gov-
ernmental objective, the federal court hold that it is constitutional. 
 c. Unequal treatment of unwed fathers and married fathers who 
divorce or separate from their spouses. 
 (1) United States Supreme Court precedent. According to case 
law from the United States Supreme Court, parental rights are not 
equally bestowed upon all fathers. In Quilloin v. Walcott,102 an un-
wed father claimed that the State of Georgia violated his equal pro-
tection rights by disallowing him the right to contest the adoption of 
his child, while allowing married fathers that right.103 The unwed fa-
ther argued that his interests and rights should have been “indistin-
guishable from those of a married father who is separated or di-
vorced from the mother and is no longer living with his child.”104 
However, the Court held that because the source of parental rights is 
not biology but rather the nature of the father-child relationship, di-
vorced or separated fathers (who are presumed to have shouldered 
significant responsibility for the rearing of their children during the 
period of marriage) should be entitled to more protection of their 
parental rights than unwed fathers (who are presumed to have not 
supported their children or established a significant tie with them).105 
Based on this case law from the United States Supreme Court, 
the disparate treatment under Utah’s Adoption Statutes of unwed 
fathers and married fathers who divorce or separate does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. Utah’s Adoption Statutes do not un-
conditionally treat unwed fathers differently from married fathers. 
Rather, Utah’s Adoption Statutes follow the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning that parental rights depend on the nature of the father-child 
relationship and allow unwed fathers who timely sign the putative fa-
ther registry the same parental rights as married fathers based on  
 
 
 102. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 103. See id. at 255–56. 
 104. Id. at 256. 
 105. See id. 
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their demonstrated interest in establishing a relationship with their 
children and in protecting their parental rights. 
 (2) Utah state court precedent. Utah state courts have held that 
unwed fathers are not entitled to the same protection of their paren-
tal rights as married fathers. In Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services,106 the 
Utah Supreme Court held Utah’s Adoption Statutes constitu-
tional.107 The court strongly endorsed marriage as the proper institu-
tion for the “procreation and rearing of children”108 and stated that 
because illegitimate children disproportionately contribute to serious 
social problems, “[i]t is not too harsh to require that those [who 
bring] children into the world outside . . . of marriage should be re-
quired . . . to comply with those statutes that accord them the op-
portunity to assert their parental rights.”109 
The state of Utah has a strong interest in having children reared 
within the bonds of marriage. Because of this strong interest, Utah 
state courts are likely to uphold the disparate treatment of unwed fa-
thers and married fathers mandated by Utah’s Adoption Statutes to 
encourage the procreation and rearing of children within the bonds 
of marriage. 
3. Policy reasons for upholding the constitutionality of Utah’s Adoption 
Statutes 
While as currently written, Utah’s Adoption Statutes may be 
found to violate the Constitution as applied in certain cases, Utah 
has strong policies supporting the state’s enforcement of such stat-
utes. 
a. Adoption provides benefits to society as a whole. Utah’s strong 
state interest in promoting and protecting adoption is founded on 
the benefits it provides to adopted children, unwed mothers, adop-
tive families, and society as a whole. For varying reasons, biological 
parents are sometimes unwilling or not prepared to raise the children 
they conceive. Adoption provides a solution in such situations by al-
lowing children to join established families who are ready to raise 
children and by giving biological parents the opportunity to pursue 
other goals and to prepare for parenthood in the future. 
 
 106. 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984). 
 107. See id. at 755. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 756. 
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Studies conducted on the consequences of adoption have re-
ported positive results with regard to adopted children.110 According 
to a study conducted by Search Institute, a public policy organiza-
tion that researches issues of concern to states and cities, children 
adopted at birth were more likely as teenagers to be living in a mid-
dle-class family with both parents present than children born into in-
tact families.111 The adopted children were also less involved in alco-
hol abuse, vandalism, fighting, weapon use, theft, and police trouble 
than children raised by single parents.112 In another study, adopted 
teens scored higher than teens raised by single parents on self-
esteem, confidence in personal judgment, self-directedness, and feel-
ings of security within families.113 
Data from the federal government indicated that adopted chil-
dren enjoyed a better quality of home environment and had superior 
access to health care when compared to children raised by unmarried 
mothers, to children of intact families, and to children raised by 
grandparents.114 Adopted children also repeated grades less often, 
had better class standing, saw mental health professionals less often, 
and had fewer behavioral problems than illegitimate children raised 
by a single mother.115 
Teenage mothers who choose adoption also enjoy many benefits. 
When compared to teenage mothers who choose to be single par-
ents, teenage mothers who choose adoption are more likely to finish 
school, to be employed within one year of giving birth, and to even-
 
 110. For a discussion of possible negative effects of adoption, see Common Clinical Issues 
Among Adoptees Who Have Received Psychological Treatment (visited Nov. 28, 2000) 
<http://www.adopting.org/commonis.html>; Carol Komissaroff, The Angry Adoptee (visited 
Nov. 28, 2000) <http://www.oara.org/info_angry_adoptee.html>; Amy Stevens, Under-
standing Adoption Therapy (visited Nov. 28, 2000) <http://www.adopting.org/ 
rwtherpy.html> 
 111. See Patrick F. Fagan, Adoption: The Best Options, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK III 2, 2–
3 (Connaught Marshner & William L. Pierce eds., 1999) (citing PETER L. BENSON ET AL., 
GROWING UP ADOPTED: A PORTRAIT OF ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (1994)). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. at 3 (citing Kathleen S. Marquis & Richard A. Detweiler, Does Adoption 
Mean Different? An Attributional Analysis, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1054 
(1985)). 
 114. See id. (citing NICHOLAS ZILL ET AL., HEALTH OF OUR NATION’S CHILDREN, 
VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 10). 
 115. See id. 
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tually marry.116 Such mothers are also less likely to suffer from pov-
erty, to receive public assistance, and to suffer from depression than 
their single-parent counterparts.117 
Finally, adoptive families also benefit from adoption. Many cou-
ples who are childless or who are unable to have more children are 
overjoyed by the opportunity to welcome a new member into their 
family through adoption. Because many adoptive parents wait years 
before adopting a child, they are often well prepared to be parents 
and responsibly fulfill their parental duties. Furthermore, siblings of 
adopted children also enjoy the companionship of their adopted 
brothers or sisters. 
The benefits of adoption to adopted children, unwed mothers, 
and adoptive family members result in benefits to society as a whole. 
Utah has a strong interest in promoting adoption because adoption 
allows members of society to enjoy a greater quality of life, educa-
tion, and health while diminishing the likelihood of suffering from 
psychological disorders and being involved in various forms of delin-
quency. 
b. Utah’s Adoption Statutes provide a mechanism for protecting 
adoption and the benefits it offers. States that have a strong interest in 
promoting adoption must have means by which the finality and per-
manency of adoptions can be guaranteed. Without such means, the 
risk of losing an adopted child may deter families from considering 
adoption. Utah’s Adoption Statutes protect the permanency and fi-
nality of infant adoptions by requiring unwed fathers to timely sign 
the state’s putative father registry in order to preserve his right to no-
tice and to consent.118 If an unwed father fails to timely sign the 
state’s putative father registry, he is barred from later bringing an ac-
tion to assert parental interest in the child.119 
Rankings of states on the Adoption Option Index120 indicate the 
effectiveness of putative father registries in promoting adoptions. Of 
the ten states ranked the highest on the Adoption Option Index in 
 
 116. See id. at 4 (citing Patrick F. Fagan, Liberal Welfare Programs: What the Data Show 
on Programs for Teenage Mothes, in BACKGROUNDER 1031 (1995)). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.13 (3)(a) (2000). 
 119. See Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
 120. The Adoption Option Index is a standardized ratio calculated by dividing the number 
of domestic infant adoptions by the sum of abortions and births to unmarried women in each 
state multiplied by 1,000. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK III, supra note 111, at 42. 
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1992, seven of those states had putative father registries.121 As states 
have become more aware of the benefits of adoption and the need to 
promote and protect it, states have established putative father regis-
tries. 
Thus, putative father registries provide a way for states to protect 
the finality of adoptions by terminating the parental rights of unwed 
fathers who do not register in a timely manner. Because there is a 
high correlation between states with putative father registries and 
high adoption rates, states with putative father registries are able to 
enjoy the societal benefits offered by adoption at a higher level. 
 c. Utah’s Adoption Statutes provide a simple way for unwed 
fathers to protect their parental rights. Allegations have been made 
that Utah’s Adoption Statutes violate principles of Due Process and 
Equal Protection by requiring an unwed father to sign in a timely 
fashion the state’s putative father registry in order to preserve his 
right to notice and consent in adoption proceedings. As discussed in 
Part IV.A.1-2, these charges are not supported by case law from the 
United States Supreme Court or Utah state courts. In reality, Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes actually provide a simple means through which an 
unwed putative father may assert and protect his parental rights. 
Putative father registries, like the one provided for by Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes, are especially helpful in protecting the parental 
rights of an unwed father when a mother does not want a father to 
have any involvement in a child’s life. By simply signing the state’s 
putative father registry, an unwed father may preserve his right to 
notice and consent in the adoption proceedings of his child without 
having to maintain contact with the child’s mother. Even if an un-
wed mother does not disclose the identity of an unwed father in an 
adoption proceeding, the father can ensure that he will receive notice 
of the proceeding and the right to consent by timely signing the pu-
tative father registry. 
If an unwed mother flees without informing an unwed father of 
her whereabouts, an unwed father will better be able to protect his 
parental rights in states that have a putative father registry. In states 
that do not have a putative father registry, although the consent of 
an unwed father may be necessary for an adoption to be finalized, an 
unwed mother may be able to lie about a father’s identity and final-
ize the adoption without the real father’s consent. In states with a 
 
 121. See id. 
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putative father registry, however, as long as an unwed father timely 
signs the registry, he will receive notice and the right to consent to 
the adoption of his child. Furthermore, by signing a state’s putative 
father registry, an unwed father can learn of an unwed mother’s loca-
tion because he will be notified if adoption proceedings commence 
in that state. 
Signing a putative father registry is very simple and can be done 
without traveling to the state of each registry. For example, a widely 
available adoption handbook, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Adop-
tion,122 provides a simple way for unwed fathers to learn about the 
adoption laws of each state. The handbook includes a chart that lists 
all the states with a putative father registry.123 A request for the 
proper forms may be made by phone, and the signing of the registry 
may be done through the mail. 
Thus, the putative father registry provides a simple and effective 
means through which an unwed father can protect his parental 
rights. Utah’s Adoption Statutes, which require an unwed father to 
timely sign a putative father registry in order to preserve his parental 
rights, offers an unwed father a means through which he can protect 
his parental rights and receive notice of adoption proceedings in 
Utah even when an unwed mother chooses not to maintain contact 
with him. 
B. Proposed Exception to Utah’s Adoption Statutes 
This Note has analyzed the constitutionality of Utah’s Adoption 
Statutes under case law from the United States Supreme Court and 
from Utah state courts, finding that the statutes do not facially vio-
late principles of due process or equal protection. However, while 
the statutes seem to be facially constitutional, they have been held to 
violate due process as applied in Ellis124 and in Baby Boy Doe.125 
Although the Utah State Legislature added an exception to 
Utah’s Adoption Statutes to avoid unconstitutionality as applied in 
cases similar to Ellis, the legislature did nothing to prevent future 
findings of unconstitutionality as applied in cases similar to Baby Boy 
 
 122. CHRIS ADAMEC, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO ADOPTION (Gary M. Krebs 
ed., 1998). 
 123. See id. at 120–23. 
 124. 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980). 
 125. 717 P.2d 686, 691 (Utah 1986). 
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Doe. In fact, for reasons discussed below, the revisions that have been 
made to Utah’s Adoption Statutes since Baby Boy Doe seem to  
intensify the likelihood that Utah’s Adoption Statutes will be found 
unconstitutional when applied in cases similar to Baby Boy Doe. 
In Baby Boy Doe, due to misrepresentations made by an unwed 
mother’s family, a baby was placed for adoption before an unwed fa-
ther had any reason to know that he needed to sign Utah’s putative 
father registry in order to preserve his right to consent to the adop-
tion of his child. Utah’s current adoption statutes include a provision 
that does not allow fraudulent representation to stand as a defense 
for unwed fathers for failing to strictly comply with the requirements 
of Utah’s Adoption Statutes.126 Adoption petitions will not be dis-
missed, finalized adoption decrees will not be vacated, and custody 
will not automatically be granted to the defrauded party.127 The only 
recourse for a victim of fraudulent representations is to pursue civil 
or criminal penalties, but custody determinations will be based on 
the best interest of each child.128 In most cases, it is unlikely that a 
court will find it in the best interest of a child who has bonded with 
her adoptive parents to be removed from a home she knows to be 
placed with a father whom she has never seen. Thus, in most cases, 
unwed fathers will probably lose the custody battle. 
Although Utah’s legislature allows mothers to refrain from dis-
closing the identity of a father, it should not allow a mother to be 
able to make fraudulent representations to a father in order to pre-
vent him from properly protecting his parental rights. The legislature 
should revise Utah’s Adoption Statutes to allow for an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of why a father did not strictly comply with the 
statutes if a father can assert a fraudulent representation claim before 
an adoption is finalized. In Utah, adoptions may be finalized six 
months after a child is placed with her adoptive parents.129 Thus, a 
father will have at least six months from a baby’s birth, and about fif-
teen months from the date of conception, to be able to discover a 
fraudulent representation. The statute of limitations will allow fathers 
a reasonable amount of time to discover that a misrepresentation has 
occurred while reasonably assuring adoptive parents of finality. Un-
 
 126. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.15(2) (2000). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See ADAMEC, supra note 122, at 122–23. 
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der the proposed exception, if a father misses this deadline, he will 
have no recourse. This strict condition will prevent the removal of 
children from their adoptive homes after familial bonding has oc-
curred. 
Just as an unwed father is deemed to be on notice that a preg-
nancy and adoption proceeding may occur if he engages in a sexual 
relationship with a woman, an unwed mother should be deemed to 
be on notice that the adoption of a child may not be finalized if a 
mother engages in fraudulent representations to an unwed father 
about her pregnancy or plans for choosing adoption. Utah’s Adop-
tion Statutes respect an unwed mother’s right to privacy with regard 
to her pregnancy and adoption plans; however, it is not unreasonable 
to expect an unwed mother to be fair in handling the adoption proc-
ess. Under the proposed statutory provision, nondisclosure of infor-
mation to an unwed father or regarding an unwed father will still be 
acceptable; however, fraudulent disclosure will not be allowed. 
With this Note’s proposed exception added to Utah’s Adoption 
Statutes, Utah’s Adoption Statutes would no longer be found un-
constitutional as applied in cases involving misrepresentation, such as 
Baby Boy Doe. Without the proposed exception, the federal court 
may determine that Utah’s Adoption Statutes are unconstitutional as 
applied to Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco) because of the alleged mis-
representation by Rodrigues regarding an abortion in her first tri-
mester. Although the facts of Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco) were 
pled inconsistently by the parties and, thus, Utah’s Adoption Stat-
utes may not ultimately result in a constitutional violation as applied 
in this case, the facts as presented by the Tenth Circuit’s opinion on 
the motion to dismiss suggest a potential weakness in the statutes 
that may result in the statutes being found unconstitutional as ap-
plied in certain cases. This weakness can be easily cured by the pro-
posed exception. Under the proposed exception, even with the al-
leged misrepresentation by Rodrigues, the federal court should hold 
that Utah’s Adoption Statutes are constitutional, both facially and as 
applied in Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco). With the addition of the 
proposed exception, if Johnson had brought his misrepresentation 
claim before the finalization of Baby Orzoco’s adoption, Johnson’s 
parental rights would not have been terminated without an eviden-
tiary hearing to show why he did not strictly comply with Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Based on case law from the United States Supreme Court and 
from Utah state courts, the federal court should hold that Utah’s 
Adoption Statutes are facially constitutional. The statutes’ require-
ment that unwed fathers timely sign the state’s putative father regis-
try in order to preserve their parental rights is not arbitrary; rather, it 
is rational and is tied to the legitimate government objectives of 
identifying fathers who are willing to accept legal responsibility for 
their children and of facilitating speedy and permanent adoptions. 
The analysis in Part IV of this Note shows that the statutes do not 
facially violate due process and equal protection considerations. 
Moreover, because of the benefits that adoption provides to adopted 
children, to unwed parents, to adoptive families, and to society as a 
whole, federal courts should recognize the importance of protecting 
the finality and permanency of adoption. 
However, Utah’s legislature should adopt the exception pro-
posed in this Note. Strict compliance with the statutes’ requirements 
should be excused if an unwed father has been fraudulently misled to 
believe that he did not need to protect his parental rights. The pro-
posed exception that allows for an evidentiary hearing if an unwed 
father brings his claim of fraudulent representation before an adop-
tion is finalized will enable Utah’s Adoption Statutes to withstand 
constitutional challenge while still protecting the finality of adop-
tions. 
Sarah K.L. Chow 
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